Abstract-Understanding the relationship between the impact of radiation at the component and system levels is challenging. This paper discusses a hierarchical approach, based on Bayesian theory, to establish a mechanism for determining system health based on the status of, and interactions between, the radiation response of component parts. When the Bayesian network is trained with a combination of experimental data, data from similar parts, simulations, and expert estimates, a quantitative estimate of the Total-Ionizing Dose (TID) response of a system can be obtained. Bayesian networks enable inference about system-level functional performance, the dose exposure, and the sensitivity of different components to TID, thus providing a framework for TID awareness in design and operation of systems. A case study of a robotic system consisting of commercial components is presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE fundamental question of interest when using electronic components in radiation environments is whether the components operate successfully together as a system for the desired application and environment (thus completing the desired mission). The primary factors in system missions success are the nature of the radiation environment and the degradation characteristics of the components. In addition, a high degree of uncertainty in system radiation tolerance estimation is introduced because of uncertainty in the radiation environment, part-to-part variability in radiation sensitivity, and the changes in operating conditions, amongst other factors. For high reliability applications, the uncertainty in operational outcome must be eliminated or reduced. This high reliability is currently and successfully accomplished by designing systems using radiation-hardened components, component-and system-level testing, maintaining significant design margins, and procurement practices that ensure that the components used are similar to the components tested [1] . These measures have proven successful for many high reliability applications such as space electronics.
A complementary concept to assurance, or guaranteeing successful operation, is awareness, understanding how and why the system performs as it does while operating in a TID environment. Awareness is useful during the field deployment to evaluate which functions can be performed, and during design to guide improvements to the system. Using systems engineering principles and Bayesian networks, this work presents a framework for quantitatively estimating the health of a system in a radiation environment, including the many interactions between the components. This approach has two primary applications. First, systems built with mostly commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components that must operate in a radiation environment, including small, inexpensive satellites (cubesats, satellite cluster formations) and robots for application in the nuclear power industry, cannot afford the costs of a full custom design including rad-hard parts. Second, during the design phase of systems that are undergoing a full custom design and hardness assurance process, detailed information about the TID response of every component under consideration for use in the design may not be available. Also if the system's TID response is not acceptable, sorting through the complex interactions leading to the system's failure can make identifying the most effective design change difficult.
In such cases, an awareness of the TID response of the components and their impact on the overall system health and performance would provide significant value. Such system-level hardness awareness schemes could enable minimal/ incremental design changes (local part selection/ shielding/ hardness improvement) in COTS systems or custom-designed high reliability systems to increase the overall system reliability in a TID environment.
A case study of a robotic system consisting of COTS components is used to illustrate the Bayesian network paradigm, with four specific examples highlighting different applications of the Bayesian network approach to model the performance of the robot in a total-ionizing dose (TID) radiation environment. A comparison to existing hardness assurance methods is included in the discussion section.
II. MOTIVATION

A. Fukushima-Daiichi
The Fukushima-Daiichi natural disaster and subsequent nuclear power incident in March 2011 created a dangerous work environment for human operators, including possible high radiation exposure levels and the requirement to wear protective suits resulting in heat and mobility issues [2] . Robotic intervention was used where possible, including surveying by terrestrial and aerial based robots or drones [2] . The ground-based robots encountered a radiation environment dominated by gamma radiation, potentially producing significant TID [3] . In the early stages of disaster survey and remediation, the robots used for intervention primarily consisted of COTS components, which went through some TID screening but not a stringent hardness assurance process [3] , a development process similar to lowcost small satellites. Currently, custom-designed robots for remediation tasks are at work at Fukushima in what is one of the largest engineering tasks in the world, scrubbing and decommissioning the contaminated areas from the disaster [4] [5] . In high dose areas, the TID response is critical to the number and quality of missions the robot can perform before being decommissioned or reconditioned. Awareness of the TID response of the system can guide the choice of missions performed based on available functionalities or identify high value improvements to the system.
B. Bayesian Networks
A Bayesian network is a graphical representation of the relationships between different probabilistic quantities. Bayesian networks draw their name from the application of Bayes' theorem (stated in Eq. (1)) which gives a method for calculating the posterior probability of occurrence of an event A given that event B has occurred ( ), from the likelihood of the occurrence of event B given that event A has occurred ( ), scaled by the prior probabilities of the events A (P(A)) and B (P(B)).
(1)
Bayesian statistics have been applied to total-ionizing dose and single-event effects previously in [6] - [9] , with a focus on the statistics of individual components. The papers cited contain a detailed discussion of the origin of Bayesian statistics and the benefits of applying Bayesian statistics in the radiation effects context. This work builds on the Bayesian statistics approach, applying the techniques to hierarchical systems consisting of multiple interacting components.
A simple four node example Bayesian network is shown in Fig. 1 , adapted from [10] , where each node represents some random variable. The graphical representation is a directed acyclical graph (DAG). While the arrows have a direction, there can be no cycles (or feedback loops). The arrows represent a correlation or causal link, and the nodes have a distribution of conditional probabilities for being in the possible nodal states, with the probabilities for all the states summing to 1. Bayesian networks have the advantage that each node is only dependent on the nodes directly linked to it. In other word, each node is conditionally independent from its non-descendants, given its parents [10] . Without the network structure, the joint probability can be calculated as the product of conditional probabilities using the same notation as example (1): (2) With the network structure the calculations can be simplified, e.g.:
Similar equations can be written for the other nodes. By chaining the node equations together in a network and solving for the target value, the desired variable can be estimated, a process called Bayesian inference [10] [11] . Software packages exist for performing Bayesian inference on an arbitrarily large network [12] .
III. BAYESIAN NETWORK CONSTRUCTION FOR TID AWARENESS
Using a Bayesian network can enable awareness of the impact of radiation-induced degradation on the variables of interest in a given system. An advantage of Bayesian networks is that the structure includes causality and independence information, enhancing prediction of system performance. While the structure can be learned from data using various algorithms, for electrical/mechanical systems there is significant information available about component interactions and performances in the form of datasheets, schematics, physics-based models, and expert knowledge. This work presents a flow for developing Bayesian networks for understanding the impact of TID on component and system performance using schematics, fault diagrams, key functional diagrams, and ultimately a multilayered structure to construct the Bayesian network. To better illustrate the methodology, a specific case-study of a line-tracking robot system is considered. This example is concise enough to present in this context, but highlights the major aspects of many electrical systems that application engineers could model, including sensing, actuation, control, and power electronics.
A. Building a Model of the System
The modelling process used for developing the Bayesian network determines the awareness and inference available from the model. The following sections provide a template for the modelling process, including the key considerations at each step.
Schematic/Block Diagram: The schematic/block diagram model captures the components involved in the system and their interactions in terms of energy and signal flow. As part of analyzing the impact of TID on the system, it is important to obtain parts lists, schematics, and other information about the system at the appropriate detail level. The appropriate detail level is determined by the user/designers' needs, such as which measurements can be made and what components can be potentially modified or replaced. For an in-house, custom-designed system this information is available in great detail and may be performed at the component level, providing information about specific components in subsystems. For a COTS system, modelling at the subsystem level may be appropriate.
The block diagram of the robot used as an example in this work is shown in Fig. 2 . The system consists of a microcontroller, infra-red reflectance line sensor, two motors, a two channel H-bridge driver, a voltage regulator, and a battery. For the sake of conciseness the subsequent sections discuss a subset of the components, focusing on the line sensor and voltage regulator. These two components yield the minimal Bayesian network that illustrates the features of the modeling method, but the analysis could be expanded to the entire system or an arbitrarily large system including hundreds or more components.
Fault Propagation: After developing the block diagram/schematic model for the system of interest, the next step is to use expert knowledge about the components and subsystems to capture the fault propagation model. Since this work is focused on studying the impact of radiation, the fault-model considers those component and system-level fault sources (failure modes) that are related to radiation exposure. The fault propagation model captures the downstream effect of each failure mode, which could include inducing anomalies (observable and unobservable), function degradation, and possibly causing other failure modes. The information obtained from the fault propagation model is useful in the context of building the Bayesian network, to determine the observable anomaly nodes that are to be related to specific components, as well as the causal relationships between the component nodes. Fig. 3 contains a simplified fault propagation model for the line sensor. It indicates the cascading effect of failure in the power-source on the operation of the sensor component, thereby affecting the quality of the sensor output signal, which could affect the performance of a downstream component/node.
Functional Dependencies: The functional dependency model determines which components and sub-functions must be operating in order for the desired higher level function to operate successfully. The diagram is orthogonal to the fault propagation model and captures the functional failures that are introduced when components/subsystems fail/degrade. The diagram does not need to be complete or capture all functionalities and can be constructed using the system expert's best estimate as to the functional dependencies. Fig. 4 shows a model of the functional dependencies for the line-tracking robot. The ultimate high level function is tracking, which requires the sub-functionalities of motor control, sensing, and power. Through clearly identifying the functional dependencies, the Bayesian network can be appropriately refined to include nodes pertaining to specific-desired functionality, including their sub-functions (if desired). The functions (and sub-functions) can be connected with the associated component-nodes that provide the desired functionality.
B. Designing the Bayesian Network
A variety of Bayesian Network software packages exist. For this paper, the networks are created using GeNIe 2.0 [13] , a software tool developed by the University of Pittsburgh's Decision Systems Laboratory. Fig. 5 shows a simplified version of the full Bayesian network that can be constructed for the line-tracking robot based on the information available in the schematics/block diagram, the fault propagation model, and the functional dependency diagrams. While the simplistic structure of the case study network could be determined through inspection, the processes presented in this work can be used for constructing an arbitrarily large network.
The top node in the network represents the amount of TID each component has received. It is divided into six states, ranging from under 10 krad( ) to under 60 krad( ). In this network, a single TID node is used to represent the TID received across all components. In cases where the components have varying degrees of TID exposure, it might be desirable to have a network with multiple TID nodes, each impacting a different set of components. Additionally, a "Time" node can be included above the TID node if there is uncertainty in the time-to-TID mapping (i.e., the dose rate) in the environment. This flexibility in network design for numerous situations is a key advantage for Bayesian networks for system health awareness in TID environments.
The next level of nodes in the network (the child nodes of the TID node) corresponds to the health of the components. Inference can then be used as feedback to update the distributions of the component level nodes to which the observation nodes connect in the network. The line sensor and linear regulator nodes capture the health of the respective components. Each of these nodes has three states: good, degraded, and failed. For the linear regulator the output voltage is the most important quantity and is directly used to describe the health of the node. For the linear regulator node's bins, good is defined as a voltage between 5 V and 4.8 V, degraded is defined as a voltage between 4.8 V and 4.5 V, and failed is defined as an output voltage below 4.5 V. The choice of these specific states and the choice of three states were determined by the characteristics of the system. The number of node states and transition points can be determined by the system designer. The line sensor has both the linear regulator and TID as parents. The addition of the connection between the linear regulator and line sensor was determined using the functional dependency and fault propagation diagrams.
Wherever possible, each of the component nodes in the Bayesian network model should include one or more child nodes that are related to measurements/observations that can be related to the health of the component. The "White Surface Sense" (the quality of the signal over a highly reflective surface) and "Supply Current" nodes correspond to the observable anomalies in the sensor and linear regulator components, respectively. They help characterize the health-status of their parent nodes. The use of observation nodes helps incorporate additional measurement information into the system in a quantitative manner. Often, variables of interest cannot be measured directly, but other variables that correlate with variables of interest can be measured [14] , [15] and hence incorporated in the Bayesian network. Though the "White Surface Sense" does not characterize the entire performance of the line sensor, it sheds light on the degradation (due to TID) of a very important part of the line sensor-the infra-red transmitter receiver pair [14] . Similarly, the "Supply Current" node does not directly describe the linear regulator but has been shown to vary with the linear regulator's health [16] . Examples of this type of inference are included in Section IV-B.
The next and final level of nodes in the Bayesian network corresponds to the system-level functionality. The parent nodes for these functionality nodes include component nodes and/or other functionality nodes. In this case, only one functionality node (tracking) is used in the Bayesian network model. This node corresponds to the highest level functionality (listed in the functional diagram). The node has three states. It has two parent nodes (the component nodes corresponding to sensor and linear regulator) and no child nodes.
Each node is independent of all the nodes to which it is not connected (all nodes that are not its direct parents or children), so changing the network structure is relatively straightforward, only requiring changes to the values of the connected nodes. If nodes are included that turn out to have a constant probability distribution versus its parent nodes it can be removed, or if a node has a 0% value for a discretization category, that category can be removed for that distribution.
Many Bayesian network applications lose correspondence between the network nodes and the physical interpretation of the network. Fig. 5 follows a four level structure for radiation degraded systems containing an environment level, a component level, an observation level, and a functional level. This general structure provides a powerful framework for generating data to populate the network for radiation degraded systems, including TID and displacement damage, where gradual degradation takes place. One advantage of this approach as compared to conventional radiation testing and modelling is that there is no direct edge between the radiation node and the final system parameter, e.g., in Fig. 5 , the tracking node, which is a high level performance parameter, does not have to be directly characterized as a function of TID.
C. Populating Bayesian Network with Probabilities
Once the structure of the Bayesian Network is determined, the next step is to populate the network parameters -the prior probabilities of the root-nodes and conditional probabilities for the other nodes. These probabilities are computed based on the data sets captured from experimentation and simulation studies. For a component like the linear regulator, multiple parts can be irradiated and characterized. For a functional node like tracking, while data can be collected through experimentation, additional data can be gathered using a physics-based simulation model and varying the parameters of the sensor and the linear regulator to simulate the tracking performance.
For a discrete Bayesian network, the continuous radiation performance data is discretized based on the specified thresholds into the discrete state of the nodes. This discretized information about the system is then used to compute the prior and conditional probabilities.
The prior probability captures the probability that a node is in a given state. Prior probability for each node-state is determined by dividing the number of occurrences of the specific state, with the sum-total of the occurrences across all the states of the node. Examples are given in the following.
The conditional probabilities represent the probability that the node is in a given state given the specified statuses of the parent nodes. In order to compute the conditional probability the data-set is restricted to the given set of parent states. The probabilities computed for each node-state with this restricted data set, correspond to the conditional probabilities of the node for the specified parent(s) state. This is repeated for all parent-state combinations to compute the probability numbers associated with all the cells. These probabilities can be updated as new information becomes available, or can be derated or additional weight given to outliers to ensure that worst case outcomes are magnified if desired. The network tool used in this work, GeNIe, accepts discrete probabilities that must sum to 1 for a given node. These probabilities can be determined in a variety of ways depending on the goals of the network (maximum likelihood estimate, worst case estimate, 95% bounds), etc. In fact, each node can on one end of the spectrum undergo a Bayesian treatment such as in [8] to construct these probabilities or on the other end of the spectrum can consist of simply binned experimental data. The full Bayesian treatment allows for incorporation into a hardness assurance process, while the binned data process may provide design insights early in the engineering process.
To provide useful inference, experimental or other sources of information must be available for all the conditions that are desired to be considered. To ensure conservative analysis, a "derating" node could be added to the network, allowing the user to select a desired dose or other parameter derating. Further information about the construction of priors can be found in [8] and [17] .
In case of the linear regulator, the voltage data collected are sorted into good/degraded/failed bins based on user specified thresholds. The corresponding parent node (TID) data are also converted into the appropriate discrete states. The procedure described above is used to compute the conditional probabilities.
The same process is followed in the case of other nodes. An example table is included in Fig. 6 . It shows the conditional probability table for the Line-Tracking node. It is generated from a combination of experimental data and modelling of the robotic line follower.
Each combination of parent states must have a value, and each column must sum to 1. The values can be determined through a combination of experiment, historical data, expert knowledge, or simply the best information available. The inference performed by the network depends on the quality of the information with which it is populated, so the higher quality of the population information, the more accurate the inference will be. In principle the Bayesian network is limited in the accuracy of its prediction for the target output variables only by the accuracy of the information in the input variables [10] . 
IV. ROBOTIC LINE FOLLOWER
The following four subsections use the case-study Bayesian network developed in the previous sections, to illustrate applications of Bayesian networks in assessing impact of TID on system health and performance.
A. Estimating Probability of Success of Key System Functions
The most straightforward application of a Bayesian Network to the radiation effects problem is forward inference-given the TID level, calculate the resulting distributions for all subsequent nodes. When the TID-level is known, the evidence/observation on the TID node can be set to the specific state (corresponding to the TID-level). Fig. 7 presents the results of fixing the TID state to "Under 50 krad( )". After setting the evidence, the software tool can execute the Bayesian Network inference algorithm [11] and compute the posterior probability distributions for the other nodes, the result of performing the inference algorithm. The results of the inference should be interpreted as: given the evidence that the TID is between 40 and 50 krad( ), there is 17% likelihood that tracking functionality is good, 50% likelihood that it is degraded, and 33% likelihood it is failed. The distribution is determined by the uncertainty and part-to-part variability in the network, which is captured in the conditional probability tables of the network nodes.
B. Inference Using Observable Parameters
A second application of Bayesian networks is inferring the probability distribution of nodes of interest, based on the evidences observed on the nodes that are easy to measure-the observable node level. Fig. 8 shows the posterior probability distribution after setting evidence in the "White Surface Sense" node to "Degraded" and in the "Supply Current" node to "Degraded" and running the inference algorithm.
The output shows a significantly narrower posterior distribution for the "TID" and "Line Tracking" nodes based on the evidences compared to performing the inference with the observable parameters unknown. In this case, the Bayesian network is able to use the observed state of the easily measurable nodes to estimate the possible range of TID values. In the field in a post-nuclear disaster environment such as the Fukushima scenario, the current TID level may be difficult to determine due to annealing and uncertainty in the knowledge of the environment.
C. Sensitivity Analysis for Design Enhancement
Bayesian networks, once designed and populated, can evaluate the sensitivity of a target node to the status of the other nodes in the network. Fig. 9 shows the sensitivity of the Tracking node to the status of the other nodes in the network, with red indicating highly sensitive and grey indicating not sensitive. This approach attempts to answer the question of which component to harden/shield/replace in order to gain a more robust TID degraded performance for the Tracking functionality. In this example, the tracking node is most sensitive to the state of the TID node and slightly more sensitive to the state of the Linear Regulator than the Line Sensor. If there was a significant difference between the Tracking node's sensitivity to the Line Sensor versus the Linear Regulator, it would provide a clear target for further investigation to see whether that node could be hardened. This type of insight may be performed by Fig. 10 . Modified network including a separate TID node for each of the components, accounting for part replacement, different shielding levels, or other factors that could produce different dose levels for different components.
a human for small networks, but for larger networks where dependencies are less clear, the Bayesian approach becomes increasingly valuable.
D. Estimating TID Levels Including Different TID Levels for Different Components
Small changes to the Bayesian network structure can provide insight into otherwise difficult-to-interpret situations. The network can and should adapt with the designer's assumptions about the characteristics of the system being modeled. As demonstrated in Fig. 10 , the impact of different components in a system receiving different TID levels can be determined by adding more TID nodes to the network. The line sensor TID node is set to 30-40 krad( ), and the second TID node is set to 40-50 krad(
). The rest of the Bayesian network remains unchanged, allowing the same types of inference to be performed as in the previous examples. For example, the probability of "good" line tracking for the TID settings shown in Fig. 10 is only 8% compared to 17% for the TID settings in Fig. 7 . By including a separate TID node, additional types of questions can be answered without any new experiments or changes to the Bayesian network. In this case, the Line Sensor may receive a different dose because of its position on the robot, shielding, or because the two components may anneal at different rates. The same types of analysis performed in the previous three subsections can be performed on this new network given the new assumption.
V. DISCUSSION
Discrete Bayesian networks provide a quantitative method for assessing the response of performance parameters of a system to TID. This awareness can be applied during the design phase of system development to gain insight into the TID hardness impact of different design options or during field operation to determine the likelihood that particular functions will be available given different possible operating scenarios and to interpret limited field measurements. The Bayesian network enables informed decision making about system capabilities, for example, when evaluating whether the system in its current radiation state can accomplish a specific mission, or whether a less demanding mission should be chosen in light of degraded functionality.
The quantitative and probabilistic nature of the network allows incorporation of many aspects of TID degradation. Partto-part variability is included automatically, with the multiple components tested falling on different sides of a discretization threshold in the probability table based on their variation. For example, if 10 parts are tested at TID level 5, with eight being good and two being degraded, at TID level 5 the network incorporates this prior knowledge of the variability in component response in the discrete distributions.
At a component level each component may be within specification even though partially degraded, which would normally imply the system performance is within specification, but the Bayesian network captures the interaction between components that may lead to a systemic failure even though the individual components are nominally within specification.
Finally the posterior probability distribution on the target functionality nodes in the Bayesian network yields an interpretable result for non-radiation effects experts.
A. Comparison with Hardness Assurance Methods
Identifying worst case responses is an important part of the hardness assurance process, and the Bayesian network approach can assist in this process. Experimental details and environmental concerns such as low dose rate response or other testing considerations such as temperature detailed in [18] can be included in the network by adding nodes to represent those conditions. This allows the network to accept priors and likelihood data for a variety of useful circumstances simultaneously, letting the user operate the network for a variety of potential conditions. The discrete Bayesian network will calculate all combinations, which can assist with Worst Case Circuit Analysis (WCCA) by identifying possible combinations of conditions that lead to degraded or failed operation. If a WCCA is already completed before construction of the Bayesian network, it can inform which nodes to include in the network.
Bayesian networks can work in conjunction with Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). FMECA provides a systematic procedure for analyzing the failure and reliability of systems and their underlying components and subsystems. In FMECA, the likelihood of occurrence of each failure mode is documented in terms of probability or component reliability estimates. The Bayesian network framework in this work focuses on component and system degradation associated with radiation exposure. The cause-effect relationship identified from FMECA can inform the construction of the network. Additional information is required to populate the conditional probability tables that capture the effect of the partial failures/ degradation as well as the impact of each parent node on its children to complete the Bayesian network.
B. Working with Hybrid Data Sets
Information about the TID response of a system can come in a variety of forms-experiments, similar parts data, historical data from different lots, simulation, or expert knowledge. For the best prediction accuracy, the network should be populated with repeated experiments on lot controlled components for the target system. However, during the design process this can be prohibitively cost-or time-intensive. Instead the mix of data types available can be used, trading expense for accuracy in a quantitative matter. Non-Bayesian hardness assurance practices do not have a quantitative method for incorporating such diverse data sets. Of course, the more accurately the data represent the actual system, the better the prediction will be.
The fundamental idea that any available component or system characterization information improves the health status prediction can leverage the wealth of information available to designers in TID databases. For example, if there is no TID degradation information about a specific desired component, use the data from a similar component and if necessary supplement the data with test data on the desired component when the data are available. This approach can be complemented with a robust set of experimental tests to perform hardness assurance on the final design if appropriate. The requirements for constructing the probabilities and priors can be determined by an organization's risk tolerance, but in general the sources of information used to inform the network must be documented, because the quality of the information directly impacts the quality of the inference performed by the network.
C. Design or Model Modification
The Bayesian network independence properties make modification or addition of nodes straightforward. Each node is only affected by its parent and children nodes. If a component is replaced with a different component, only the replaced node and its direct children nodes need to have their probability tables updated. During the design process component changes may occur regularly, and the Bayesian network can use the most recent information available to make a quantitative prediction or perform a sensitivity analysis.
Structuring the network in four layers allows for easier network modification. The component layer is the only layer that interacts with the environment and may require TID testing. The rest of the layers can be populated with simulation data from physics-based circuit or system level simulations, using the component-level-degradation data in a standard electrical/ mechanical modelling and simulation flow.
D. Sensitivity to Discretization Process
Bayesian networks can be seen as an upgrade to binary modelling of component failure (components are either within specification or not) because of the ability to model and propagate many possible node states in a probabilistic and quantitative way. For TID-degraded systems, the multiple possible node states reflect the physical reality that there are states between ideal functionality and failure. In the models presented in this paper three states were chosen (Good, Degraded, Failed), but an arbitrarily large set of states could be chosen to reflect the nature of the system being modeled. As the number of discretization states is increased, additional experimental or simulation information is needed to populate the enlarged probability tables. This can result in a significant increase in the size of the probability tables used to populate the network. A limitation of the discrete Bayesian network technique is that the predictions are sensitive to the discretization process. A part failing at 49 krad( ) versus 51 krad( ) can be placed in different bins according to which discretization scheme is used, impacting the inference artificially. Artifacts like this can become problematic if small sample sizes are used to populate the probability tables. Continuous probability distribution Bayesian networks are available [19] , which eliminate problems arising from discretization, but which introduce sampling and convergence complications.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Bayesian networks can be applied to the TID reliability arena through a systematic approach of analyzing the system for functional dependencies and designing a structured Bayesian network. The advantage of a Bayesian network is that it extends the benefits of using Bayesian statistics for component level reliability to systems where simultaneous component degradations can interact, leading to impacts on system level performance that might not be predicted from examining component radiation sensitivities alone. The Bayesian network helps give quantitative insight into the state and sensitivities in the system, using inference to answer questions about:
• System function availability at certain dose levels • Interpretation of system health measurements • Sensitivity analysis • Estimation of current TID the system has received. The Bayesian network approach can work with a variety of data sources, such as simulations, radiation hardness data on similar parts, etc. This allows quantitative estimation of radiation hardness even before complete radiation testing is performed on a new electronic system. Of course the quality of the estimation improves when more accurate models are used for each node in the network. Bayesian networks are flexible and can be adapted and reused efficiently due to the independence of nodes that are not directly connected by an edge, which means a model for a node in the network can be updated independently of the not directly connected other nodes in the network. The Bayesian network can provide insight into radiation impacts starting with design decisions and continuing through field deployment.
